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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
to national security should be readily admissible in federal courts.
The importance of national survival needs no elaboration. With
this exception, the Nardone Case represents not only good law but
good policy. The evils which free admissibility would correct
(i.e. the escape of criminals) would be overbalanced by new evils
resulting from encroachment upon individual privacy. As observed
in the dissenting opinion of the Goldstein Case, every reasonable
prohibition calculated to destroy the menace of wiretappng should
be ndopted, even though some criminals escape.
JAMES H. O'KEEFE.
TORTS-INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS-INCLUD-
INc BREACH OF CoNTRAcT.-In the year 1853 one Lumley entered
into a contract with one Johanna Wagner who agreed to perform
for a certain term at Lumley's theatre and not to sing or use her
talents elsewhere without Lumley's consent. Before the time of per-
formance one Gye induced Miss Wagner to breach her contract of
which he had knowledge. Lumley brought an action in tort against
Gye alleging these facts and praying for the special damages which
he had suffered. The defendant Gye demurred to the complaint
but the English court overruled the plea and entered judgment for
the plaintiff saying: "He who maliciously procures a damage to
another by violation of his right ought to' be made to indemnify;
and that, whether he procures an actionable wrong or a breach of
contract."' Thus was born the "doctrine of Lumley v. Gye", set-
ting forth in definitive form the tort of inducing breach of contract, 2
which has since been accepted in England3 and in the vast majority
of jurisdictions in the* United States.4
Originally the action appeared as a remedy available to the
Roman pater-familias for damages sustained by him due to violence
committed on his family or slaves. England eventually adopted this
type of action as a part of the common law, and in 1350 when the
Black Death left a great shortage of labor, created an additional
remedy by instituting the Statute of Labourers. Under that act a
penalty was provided to prevent a laborer from running away, and
1. 2 El. & BI. 216 (Q.B. 1853).
2. See Prosser, Torts 977 (1941).
3. See, e.g., Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q.B.D. 333, 50 L.J.Q.B. 305 (1881).
4. See Prosser, supra note 2, at 979.
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a remedy given to the master against anyone who received or re-
tained him., Courts in the United States were at first reluctant to
recognize the tort of inducing breach of contract except in cases
of personal services. 6 Nearly all states at present, however, will
apply the tort regardless of the type of contract involved, 7 provided
that it is in force and not illegal, 9 or opposed to public policy.10 It
has been said that most jurisdictions would also protect a contract
terminable at will since until it is terminated the contract is a sub-
sisting relation, of value to the plaintiff, and presumably to continue
in effect."
In order to maintain an action for "inducing breach of contract",
it is essential that the plaintiff allege the following: (1) a valid
contract between the plaintiff and a third party (2) of which the
defendant had knowledge, and (3) that the defendant intentionally
induced the third party not to perform the contract (4) thereby
causing the plaintiff damages. 12 It has been held that knowledge of
the existing contract is a prerequisite condition of liability for in-
ducing its breach. 13 Although proof of some damage is necessary
to the action, 4 when it is clear that there has been damage but its
extent cannot be proved, nominal damages may be awarded."'
"Interference with contract, which had its origin in 'malice', has
remained almost entirely an intentional tort, and liability has not
been extended to the various forms of negligence by which perform-
ance of a contract may be prevented". 6 No satisfactory reason has
been given for this refusal of a remedy in negligence cases. 17 It has
been recently recognized that a plaintiff need not allege malice in
his complaint, since the tort does not depend on any spite or ill will
on the part of the defendant.8 Bad motives, it has been said, may
make a bad act worse, but will not make an act bad which is in
essence lawful."0 For the sake of clarity "malice" could well be
5. See Smith and Prosser, Cases and Materials on Torts 1204 (1952).
6. See Prosser, Torts 978 (1941).
7. Id. at 979.
8. See Triangle Film Corporation v. Artcraft Pictures Corp., 250 F.2d 981 (2d Cir.
1918).
9. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
10. Seitz v. Michel, 148 Minn. 474, 181 N.W. 106 (1921).
11. See Carpenter, Interference With Contract Relations, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 728, 743
(1928).
12. Childress %. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176, 181 (1954).
13. Sineath v. Katzis, 218 N.C. 740, 12 S.E. 2d 671 (1941).
14. Hodge v. Meyer, 252 Fed. 479 (2d Cir. 1918).
15. See Raymond v. Yarrington, 96 Tex. 443, 73 S.W. 800, 804 (1903).
16. See Prosser, Torts 991 (1941).
17. Id. at 992 n.2 6, citing Carpenter suln'a note 11.
18. See Avon Pioducts Inc. v. Berson, 135 N.Y.S.2d 867, 870 (1954).
19. Jenkins v. Fowler, 24 Pa. St. 308 (1859).
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omitted as a requirement for the tort of inducing breach of con-
tract, for "malice" is proved if it is shown that the defendant with
knowledge of the contract intentionally and without justification
induced its breach. 20
When is a defendant acting "without justification" in inducing
a breach of contract? That problem has tormented courts in the
past, and as business and contractual relationships grow increas-
ingly more complicated it is not unreasonable to assume that it will
continue to be troublesome. There are many instances when it is
clear that the defendant inducing the breach has justification. It
has not been denied, for instance, that a parent can justifiably in-
duce his child to breach a marriage contract.2 This right is based
on public policy making it the parent's duty to guide his children
and advise them. Under certain conditions, unions would be justi-
fied in inducing employees to breach their employment contract,
possibly on the theory that public policy favors the welfare of work-
ers over the integrity of the employer's contract. 2 -
An interesting illustration of an instance where a plaintiff was
denied recovery because of a superior existing right in the defend-
ant, was the celebrated English case of Brimelow v. Casson.23 -In
that case, Jack Arnold, the manager of a burlesque troupe, so badly
underpaid the girls of the chorus that: ". . . they were forced to
eke out a living by plying another and an older trade."24
Upon learning of this situation, one Lugg, secretary of the Actors'
Association, persuaded the owners of theaters with which the plain-
tiff had contracts, to cancel them unless higher wages would be
paid. In denying the bill to enjoin the defendant from inducing
such breaches, the court said in reference to the conduct of the de-
fendant, ". . . but have they in law justification for their acts? . . .
these defendants, as it seems to me, owed a duty to their calling and
to its members, and, I am tempted to add, to the public, to take
all necessary peaceful steps to terminate the payment of this in-
sufficient wage"."
While the foregoing examples illustrate circumstances in which
the defendant was justified in inducing a breach, other situations
20. Childress v. Abeles, 204 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176 (1954).
21. Nelson v. Melvin, 236 Iowa 604, 19 N.W.2d 685 (1945).
22. See Imperial Ice Co. v. Bossier, 18 Cal. 2d 36, 112 P.2d 631 (1941).
23. 93 L.J.Rep. (Chan. Div.) 256, 1 Ch. 302 (1924).
24. See Smith and Prosser, Cases and Materials on Torts 1222 (1952).
25. See also MacNeil, Ballad of Brimelow v. "Casson in Smith and Prosser, op. cit.
supra at 1225.
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have arisen where the conflicting interests of the plaintiff and the
defendant were more equal. In a leading Minnesota case,26 plain-
tiff, an automobile dealer, had an agency contract with the manu-
facturer which was terminable at will upon giving ten days notice.
The defendant, a rival automobile dealer in the same town, induced
the manufacturer to breach his contract with the plaintiff, and
secured for himself the agency contract. In holding that the plain-
tiff had a cause of action, the court said that while the defendant
might be justified in advancing his own business interests, he did
not have the right to induce a breach of the plaintiff's contract. The
court also stated: "The contract between plaintiff and defendant
imposes duties and rights. This contract and the benefits therefrom
constituted a property right. An intentional interference therewith
by one not having an equal or superior right is wrongful and pre-
cipitates liability".27 Mr. Justice Stone in his very persuasive dissent
argued that property rights are on no higher level than personal
rights, and went on to suggest that there is no "wrongful inter-
ference"'unless there has been the purposeful procuring of a breach
of a contract by a stranger to it who has no legitimate interest to
serve, or having one, uses unlawful means to effect his purpose.2"
Situations should be distinguished where the breach is induced
or procured by the defendant and where the breach is merely an
indirect result or is incidentally caused by the defendant's actions.2"
For example, if a vendor lowers his prices below that of'his com-
petitors it might well be that customers of his competitor would
thereby be induced to breach their contracts in order to take ad-
vantage of the vendor's offer. In this type of case it could be said
that the breach is merely incidentally caused by the person who
lowers his price, and to hold him liable would be to contradict the
fundamental principles of free enterprise. 0 It has been held that
mere disinterested advice which induces an employee to violate
his instructions so as to injure his employer will not render the
party giving the advice liable in tort.2 1 The same is true where a
defendant merel advises a party to a contract of his legal rights
and thereby induces a breach.3 2
26. Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 171 Minn. 260, 214 N.W. 754 (1927).
27. Id. at 756.
28. Id. at 757.
29. See Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 663 (1923).
30. See Imperial Ice Co. v. Bossier, 18 Cal. 2d 36, 112 P.2d 631 (1941).
31. Cf. Coakley v. Degner, 191 Wis. 170, 210 N.W. 359 (1926).
32. Sweeley v. Gordon, 47 Cal. App. 2d 716, 118 P.2d 842 (1941).
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Another type of case which should be recognized is that in which
a physician induces his patient to breach his employment contract
for health reasons, where an attorney in good faith advises his client
to breach his contract and subject himself to damages, or even
where a trusted friend advises a breach of contract. The distin-
guishing feature of this type of case apparently is the particular
interest of the party inducing the breach as compared with the
party whose contract has been violated.33 It would seem that public
policy would favor the giving of uninhibited advice by doctors,
lawyers, and friends, and of course the advice they would give
could hardly be uninhibited if they were liable for inducing breach
of contract. In each case their chief interest is the welfare of the
party to whom they are giving the advice, and the contract itself
is at most a secondary consideration. Also, these advisors will re-
ceive their fee regardless of whether or not their advice is followed;
therefore it cannot be said that they caused the breach in an effort
to appropriate to themselves that which belongs to another. 3 4
Although the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions allow the
action, "North Dakota is one of a minority of States holding that
an action in tort for wrongfully inducing breach of contract may
only be maintained on proof that the breach complained of was
induced by direct fraud or coercion on the part of the defendant"."5
The reasoning which supports this stand was set forth in 1911 in
the leading case of Sleeper v. Baker3" and was again approved in
1934,23 in the only other case in which the courts of North Dakota
have dealt with the problem. 8 Quoting from an old Kentucky
decision39 the court said: ".... an action cannot in general be main-
tained for inducing a third person to breach his contract with the
plaintiff; the consequence at law being only a broken contract for
which the party to the contract may have his remedy by suing upon
it." 40
It may be true that an action for damages on the contract is a
33. Cf. Legris v. Marcotte 129 fI1. App. 67 (1906) (Defendant induced school
authorities to deny plaintiff's children admittance by advising them of plaintiff's diseased
condition.)
34. See Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 171 Minn. 260, 214 N.W. 754, 756 (1927).
35. See Voss v. Becko, 192 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1951).
36. 22 N.D. 386, 134 N.W. 716 (1911).
37. Wedwick v. Russell-Miller Milling Co., 64 N.D. 690, 256 N.W. 107 (1934);
cf. Bekken v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 70 N.D. 122, 293 N.W. 200
(1940).
38. See Voss v. Becko, supra note 35.
39. Chambers v. Baldwin, 91 Ky. 121, 15 S.W. 58 (1891).
40. Sleeper v. Baker, 22 N.D. 386, 394, 134 N.W. 716, 719 (1911).
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sufficient remedy. However, a recent New York case 41 permitting
an action for inducing breach of contract reveals an instance when
it may not be. In that case plaintiff, a cosmetic manufacturing cor-
poration, had for more than sixty-five years sold its products
through sales representatives assigned to specific territories. These
agents were authorized to sell only to ultimate consumers, and not
to wholesalers or retailers. Defendants, with knowledge of this
limitation, induced the plaintiffs sales representatives to sell plain-
tiff's products to them for the purpose of resale at their pharmacy.
The plaintiff in this case would have been hard pressed to recover
damages on the contract since it did not know which of its sales-
men were committing the breach. Even if it had, it is not un-
reasonable to argue that the amount of money damages with which
a salesman might be able to respond would be inadequate to com-
pensate the corporation for the good will and advertising' benefits
which were lost. Also if the plaintiff in this situation had known
the identity of the salesmen and wished to recover on the contract,
it would have been subjected to the hardships of collecting judg-
ments against a number of individuals. It is not inconceivable that
there are other situations in which contract damages would be less
than adequate. Contract damages are limited to those within the
contemplation of the parties,42 while damages in the case of an
intentional tort are awarded for proxmately resulting harm whether
or not it was expectable. 43
Where tort recovery is allowed for inducing breach of contract
the problem remains for courts to decide when a party inducing a
breach is justified. In deciding this it may be helpful to first answer
the question of whether the breach was accidentally caused or
whether it was actually procured. When it has been resolved that
a breach has been induced, the problem of justification may well be
settled by observing the following criteria adopted by the Restate-
ment of Torts § 767: "(a) Nature of actor's conduct. (b) Nature of
the expectancy with which he interferes. (c) Relation between the
parties. (d) Interest sought to be advanced by the actor. (e) Social
interest in protecting the expectancy on one hand, and the actor's
freedom of action on the other."
FRnANcs BREIDENBACH.
41. See Avon Products Inc. v. Berson, 135 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1954).
42. Restatement, Contracts §330 (1932).
43. Restatement, Torts §915 (1939).
